In this paper I provide some linguistic evidence to the thesis that responsibility judgments are normative.
Introduction
In this paper I suggest that negations of responsibility judgments are isomorphic to the negation of normative sentences. It is only external negation that inverts the value of responsibility judgments, thus providing a prima facie evidence to consider responsibility judgments non-descriptive and normative-like.
First, I contrast two sorts of negation: negation of normative sentences and negation of descriptive sentences, pointing out where they differ. My provisional hypothesis is that internal negation and external negation work in opposite ways for descriptive sentences and normative sentences. (i) In descriptive sentences internal negation inverts their (truth) value; 1 whereas (ii) in normative sentences it is external negation that changes their (normative) value.
Second, I consider denials of responsibility. I show that negation of responsibility judgments falls under case (ii). It is only external negation that inverts the value of responsibility judgments, thus suggesting at least an analogy between responsibility judgments and normative judgments.
In the end of this paper I confront with three apparently possible objections to my argument: first, I have begged the question in the definition of responsibility judgments; second, all I have shown is that external negation inverts the value of sentences if they are not descriptive, but this tells nothing about the exact nature of those sentences; third, that these features of negation hold for other modalities, so there is nothing special about normativity. This paper aims at clarifying the various kinds of negation in logic and natural language (in §2). It then advances an interpretation of normative negation ( §3) and considers how this model might shed light on responsibility judgments and in particular on negative responsibility judgments ( §4).
Negation, Negations
I shall now briefly introduce some concepts I use in this paper, namely: (i) the difference between negation, denial and rejection; (ii) the difference between logical negation and natural language negations, including internal vs external negation and metalinguistic negation. 2
Negation, Denial, Rejection
For the purposes of this chapter, I shall adopt the now common distinction among negation, denial and rejection. 3 While these definitions are apodictically stated, nothing significant for my arguments relies on them.
Very roughly, negation acts on contents. For instance, 'unhappy' is the negation of 'happy '. 4 Denial is, instead, an act. It can be either a linguistic act, or a non-linguistic act (for instance: shaking one's head).
Rejection is, instead, a mental attitude. 5
Internal vs. External Negation
Due to a felicitous intuition in [26], 6 the well-known sentence:
(1) The King of France is not bald can be given two readings, usually paraphrased as follows: 7
